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WHAT  HAPPENS  TO  THE  “BAD  APPLES”:
AN  EMPIRICAL  STUDY  OF  SUSPENSIONS  IN
NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS
Peter H. Schuck, Matthew Matera & David I. Noah*
INTRODUCTION
The current study grows out of earlier research—conducted by
one of us (with a collaborator) and published in book form1 in
2006—on the following problem: In many public programs that seek
to improve social conditions and increase opportunity for low-income
people, a relatively small number of participants, whom the study
termed “bad apples,”2 so severely disrupt those programs that they
prevent the rest of the participants from gaining the programs’ full
benefits.  The public school system is the most important venue in
which the bad apples problem occurs, and the current study seeks to
increase our understanding of how the system tries to manage this
problem.
Roughly 1.1 million students are enrolled in the New York City
public schools each year.3  Over the period spanning the 2005–06 and
2009–10 school years, the schools issued 323,680 suspensions, or
 2012 Peter H. Schuck, Matthew Matera & David I. Noah.  Individuals and
nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any
format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the
author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in
the copyright notice.
* Peter H. Schuck is the Simeon E. Baldwin Professor Emeritus of Law at Yale
University.  David I. Noah (Yale Law School Class of 2009) is a Managing Director at a
high performing charter network in New York City, and Matthew Matera (Yale Law
School Class of 2011) is the human capital fellow at New Schools for New Orleans.
The authors would like to thank those who helped us obtain the data presented here.
1 PETER H. SCHUCK & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, TARGETING IN SOCIAL PROGRAMS,
81–87 (2006).
2 See id. at 76, 77–80 (defining bad apples as “an individual whose irresponsible,
immoral, or illegal behavior in the past—and likely the future as well—causes good
apples in a particular program to benefit less than they otherwise would”).
3 About Us, NYC DEP’T OF EDUC., http://schools.nyc.gov/AboutUs/default.htm
(last visited May 14, 2012).
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about 64,736 a year.4  This works out to significantly less than 5.9% of
the total enrolled students in the system during those five years
because many of the suspended students were repeat offenders.
These suspended students are responsible for a great deal of the time,
energy, money, and other resources that the system expends on stu-
dent discipline and classroom management.  Even more importantly,
they are presumably responsible for much of the disruptive behavior
that impedes classroom learning for all students.
Past studies have found that the New York City school system has
higher suspension rates for students of color, students who are male,
and students with special needs.5  The system also may fail to ensure
that all students, even the more disruptive ones, receive the support
they need to succeed academically or to at least complete high school.
This study attempts to probe more deeply into the data on suspen-
sions in New York City and to learn how schools use suspensions (to
improve behavior, to aid classroom management, to improve test
scores, etc.) and, thus, to consider whether and how they can use sus-
pensions more effectively—for example, by issuing them more or less
frequently or in different ways.
The introduction that follows, taken verbatim from an earlier
project,6 presents some necessary background for the current study:
Widespread, intense concern about the harmful effects of disruptive
students on their peers is evident in public opinion polls and
surveys of both teachers and students.  This finding is hardly surpris-
ing.  The externality and public good aspects of classroom educa-
tion mean that just as students can learn from each other as well as
from their teachers, so too can one student’s misconduct quickly
cascade through the classroom, thereby reducing learning for all.7
For purposes of this discussion, we call such chronically disruptive stu-
dents “bad apples.”
Although disruptive behavior and discipline problems can be
defined in different ways, data sets in this area often distinguish
among four crude categories of misconduct: disruption, nonserious
violence, violence, and criminal violence.8  According to one report,
more than seventy-seven percent of public elementary and secondary
schools suffered at least one violent incident (as defined in the
report) during the 1999–2000 year, and students were more likely to
4 Data provided on request by the New York City Department of Education, and
it is on file with the authors.
5  Id.
6  SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 80–98. R
7 Id. at 81.
8 See id.
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fear being attacked at school than being attacked when away from
school.9  Schools that reported a large number of serious discipline
problems were more likely to experience violent criminal incidents,
including rape, sexual battery, physical attacks, and robbery.10
Not surprisingly, the risk of encountering violence in school is
concentrated in poor areas and is greatest for economically disadvan-
taged students.11  Some believe that noncriminal incidents, which are
of course far more common than violent crime, are more responsible
for disrupting the educational environment and making it more diffi-
cult for students to learn.12  There are also suggestions that officials, at
least in New York City, under-report violent and disruptive incidents
in the public schools.13
In a May 2004 study, a third of the teachers surveyed said that
because of student discipline problems, they had either considered
leaving or knew colleagues who had left the profession.14  Almost
twenty percent of parents reported that discipline problems had
caused them to consider moving their child to another school or that
they had already done so.15  Nearly eight in ten teachers (seventy-
eight percent) said that their school had students who should be
removed and sent to alternative schools.16  The same percentage
reported that students are quick to remind them that they have rights
or that their parents can sue.17  A majority of teachers (fifty-five per-
cent) said that discipline problems were also the result of school offi-
cials backing down in the face of assertive parents.  The survey found
that parents and teachers favored allowing discipline-related lawsuits
9 JILL F. DEVOE ET AL., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2002, 32, 65
(Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, 2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/iscs02.pdf
10 AMANDA K. MILLER & KATHRYN CHANDLER, VIOLENCE IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
2000 SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY 4, 19–20 (Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics,
2003).
11 Id. at 39, 57–58.
12 See Susan Saulny, Noncrime Disturbances Rise at Tough Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
2005, at B8.
13 David M. Herszenhorn, Data on Violence in City Schools Is Questioned, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 2006, at B6.
14 PUB. AGENDA, TEACHING INTERRUPTED: DO DISCIPLINE POLICIES IN TODAY’S PUB-
LIC SCHOOLS FOSTER THE COMMON GOOD? 10 (2004), available at http://publi-
cagenda.org/files/pdf/teaching_interrupted.pdf.
15 Id. at 53.
16 Id. at 14.
17 Id. at 23.
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only in cases where serious sanctions like expulsion are imposed and
that in such cases monetary awards against schools should be barred.18
Although some federal and state laws address the problem of
chronic disruption by a small core group of students, most policy
responses occur at the local school district or individual school level.19
These responses include: rules at the level of the school district or
school and a number of practices, such as the use of metal detectors
and hallway monitors; specific modes of punishment, such as corporal
punishment (especially in the South); removal of the disruptive stu-
dents from the classroom; and placement of the disruptive students in
alternative schools.20  A number of the alternative schools serving
these removed students offer crisis or behavioral intervention.21  Nev-
ertheless, the fragmentary evidence suggests that many efforts to
remove violent and chronically disruptive students fail at that task and
that the removals that do occur are often not timely.22
A recent study by Richard Arum of the discipline problem in pub-
lic schools places much of the blame on judicial decisions that broadly
extended due process rights to students in public schools, as well as
on an increase in related educational regulations and legislation that
have constrained the authority of teachers and school administrators
and often prevented them from taking prompt and effective action to
curb disruptive behavior.23  In particular, the Supreme Court’s 1975
decision in Goss v. Lopez,24 involving students suspended for fighting
in the lunchroom, extended due process rights—there, notice and an
opportunity to be heard—even to students facing relatively minor
school discipline, such as suspensions of ten days or less.25  Presuma-
bly, students facing more serious discipline, such as expulsion or
transfer to alternative programs, had more extensive procedural
rights.
Post-Goss court decisions have held that the constitutionally
required hearing for a short-term suspension is minimal; one com-
mentator insists that Goss would be satisfied by “a three-minute due
18 Id. at 32.
19  SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 82. R
20  Id.
21 BRIAN KLEINER, PUBLIC ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS AND PROGRAMS FOR STUDENTS AT
RISK OF EDUCATION FAILURE: 2000–01, 6, 10, 23, 27 (Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics,
2002).
22  See Elissa Gootman, Gotbaum Says City is Failing to Remove Violent Students, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at B2.
23  See generally RICHARD ARUM, JUDGING SCHOOL DISCIPLINE (2003) (examining
the extent to which judicial court decisions have affected public school discipline).
24 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
25  Id. at 581.
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process [hearing].”26  She suggested that due process would be satis-
fied if the school officials tell the student the charge, give the student
the opportunity to tell his/her side of the story, listen, and make a
decision.27  The Goss hearing need not include written notice, pre-
suspension notification of parents, an opportunity for parents to tell
their side of the story, time to prepare a presentation, a right to coun-
sel, a right to offer or cross-examine witnesses, or a right to appeal the
decision.  Nonetheless, state law and local school board policies often
provide students with additional procedural rights.  Some courts, state
laws, and administrative policies have even extended these rights to in-
school suspensions or isolation, as well as out-of-school suspensions
shorter than that involved in Goss. This “due process creep,” as this
commentator has called it,28 may encourage misconduct by making it
much more costly for school officials to impose discipline.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),29 enacted
in the same year as Goss, conferred further substantive and procedural
rights on students with disabilities.  The statute defines disabilities to
include mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness,
speech or language impairments, visual impairments including blind-
ness, emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, trau-
matic brain injury, other health impairments, specific learning
disabilities, multiple disabilities, or developmental delay.30  Students
with these disabilities need special education and related services.
Subsequent amendments to IDEA, most recently in December
2004, expanded the rights of disabled students, notably in discipline
cases.  Since IDEA’s purpose is to mainstream special education stu-
dents into the “least restrictive environment,”31 it limits schools’ ability
to remove disabled students from the classroom, particularly when
their misconduct stems from their disability.  Although this is a noble
goal, the statute has had the severe unintended side effect of inhib-
iting the removal of bad apples, thereby blighting the educations of
vast numbers of good apple students.
IDEA does not seriously impede removals for short periods.32
Schools may suspend disabled students for less than ten days for
whatever reason, as long as the suspension would be appropriate for
26 Julie Underwood, The 30th Anniversary of Goss v. Lopez, 198 EDUC. L. REP. 795,
797 (2005).
27  Id. at 799.
28  Id. at 800.
29 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
30 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2006).
31 SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 83. R
32 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400.
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similarly situated nondisabled students.33  Thus, short-term suspen-
sion remains an option even when the misconduct stems directly from
the student’s disability.  For violations related to weapons, drugs, or
serious bodily injury, schools can also remove a special needs child for
up to forty-five days to an interim educational setting.34
Under the statute, schools cannot remove a disabled student
from public school for more than ten consecutive days for disruptive
behavior that falls short of “serious misconduct” and that is deemed to
have arisen from the student’s disability.35  When such a situation
arises, the school must conduct a “manifestation hearing” in which
the parent bears the burden of proof that the disability caused the
misconduct.36  (Until July 2005, the school bore the burden of prov-
ing that the misconduct was not disability related.)37  In addition, par-
ents are statutorily entitled to a due process hearing to vindicate the
child’s right to a “free” and “appropriate”38 public education.39
Under IDEA, if the misconduct did not arise from the disability, then
the school may suspend the student, but must still provide an interim
alternative education program that provides the instruction that the
student needs to make effective progress.40  In addition to this federal
statute, forty-one states (as of 2000) had passed laws establishing the
reasons for which students can be expelled or suspended, and forty-
nine had laws setting grounds for expulsion.41
Under IDEA, two problems for school authorities remain: show-
ing that disruption was not due to disability (which has been very
broadly defined) and providing quality education to others despite
the presence of disruptive students whose misbehavior is determined
to be disability-related.42  In practice, suspensions are very infrequent
and expulsions exceedingly rare, despite the widespread disruptive
behavior.  The U.S. Department of Education provides the most com-
prehensive nationwide data on suspensions and expulsions based on
33 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B) (2006).
34 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(G) (describing the authority of school personnel in
special circumstances).
35 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B).
36 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(F).
37 SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 84. R
38 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006) (describing one of the purposes of the
statute as to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a “free
appropriate public education”).
39 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A).
40 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C).
41 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSE-
QUENCES OF ZERO-TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 39 (2002).
42  SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 84. R
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reports from 88,000 schools for the 2000–01 school year.43  Of the
46,300,000 students in the database, 6.6% received out-of-school sus-
pensions, and only 0.21% were expelled.44  The suspension rate varied
from state to state.  In North Dakota, 2.4% of students were sus-
pended; in South Carolina, the figure was 14.6%.  For expulsions, the
rate across states ranged from zero to just under 0.8%.45  Thus, the
bad apples who are removed even temporarily appear to comprise
only a small fraction of the bad apple populations within schools.
Disabled students protected by IDEA and other such laws are sel-
dom suspended or expelled from public schools.46  Approximately
1.4% of the almost six million students considered disabled and
receiving services under IDEA (who in turn constitute about twelve
percent of all students) were removed for a period greater than ten
days during 2000.47  A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
study, based primarily on a survey of middle and high school princi-
pals in a limited number of states, found that the rate of incidents of
serious misconduct—violent behavior, drugs, weapons, firearms—was
more than three times higher among students with disabilities than
among regular education students (fifty per thousand versus fifteen
per thousand).48  In both groups, 60 to 65% of students who engaged
in serious misconduct were given out-of-school suspensions, and about
one in six was expelled.49  The main difference was that a higher pro-
portion of expelled special education students received post-expul-
sion education services.50  In addition to the IDEA rules, many local
school districts (86% of those responding to the GAO survey) have
adopted their own protections for disabled students on top of IDEA
rules; these additional protections, often imposed by court-mandated
consent decrees, obviously restrict disciplinary actions even more.51
Almost two-thirds of principals reported that they operate under a
local policy that prevents them from suspending special education stu-
dents for more than ten cumulative days in a school year.52
43 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OCR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SURVEY: 2000
(on file with authors).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 84. R
47 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 43 (on file with authors).
48 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-210, STUDENT DISCIPLINE: INDIVID-
UALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 15–20 (2001).
49 Id. at 6.
50 Id. at 16.
51 Id. at 7.
52 Id.
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We suspect, but the existing data cannot demonstrate, that dis-
ruptive students who are not disabled and thus are not covered by
IDEA can nonetheless take advantage of the constraints on discipli-
nary action that IDEA imposes on schools.  Principals surely have
more difficulty expelling student A, who is not covered by IDEA, when
student B, who is covered by it, committed the same or worse infrac-
tion and because of the law was not expelled.  Presumably, bad apple
students—those who are protected by the law and those who are
not—quickly learn about such disparities through the notoriously
effective grapevine that exists in schools.  One would expect them, as
the notion of moral hazard suggests, to take these disparities into
account in deciding how to behave.53
Students are increasingly likely, through their parents, to chal-
lenge their school-imposed punishments in the courts.  This trend,
which has been facilitated by changes in the law governing school dis-
cipline that began in the 1990s, has greatly complicated the problem
of school discipline.54  Urgent public concern about disruptive and
violent students possessing and selling weapons and drugs in the pub-
lic schools led many states and school districts to adopt zero-tolerance
disciplinary policies, often in the form of administrative rules that
authorize or require school officials to impose a specific punishment,
usually expulsion or long-term suspension, for certain types of infrac-
tions.  At the same time, however, Congress was enacting laws protect-
ing disabled individuals against discrimination in public programs
and was also expanding the IDEA rights of disabled students (among
those most likely to misbehave) to avoid school discipline for disabil-
ity-related misbehavior.55
The effects of this collision between public policies such as zero-
tolerance that increase schools’ disciplinary options and other policies
that limit those options by enlarging students’ rights have recently
been studied by Richard Arum and his associates.56  They find that
these policy changes, which created an ambiguous legal regime sur-
rounding school discipline, were followed by an unprecedented
upsurge in lawsuits over school discipline.57  In this litigation, the
courts tended to uphold the schools in cases involving zero-tolerance
discipline, but favored the students in those cases where they also
claimed disability.  Not surprisingly, it was the more affluent parents
53 SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 85. R
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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who were more likely to litigate these cases in the appellate courts.58
Complaints about this new legal regime have centered on multiple
and violent offenders whom the schools could not quickly remove and
who therefore remained to terrorize their classmates.59
What happens to misbehaving students who are removed from
school?  According to a GAO report on special needs students,
removed students’ short-term placements (fewer than ten days) were
primarily either in in-school suspension rooms or at home, but those
students removed for more than ten days were primarily placed in
alternative schools or homebound placements.60  As amended, IDEA
mandates that disabled children receive a functional behavior assess-
ment, behavioral intervention services, and modifications designed to
address the misconduct; it does not require any reintegration services
to prepare removed students for a return to their traditional educa-
tional settings.61  Under New York City law, however, students who are
released from alternative programs must be placed in mainstream
schools within five days of applying, and no school can turn them
away.62  This entitlement or “right of return” helps to explain why dis-
ruptive preschoolers, who ordinarily have no entitlement to preschool
education, are expelled from their programs in much higher propor-
tions than are their disruptive elders.63
Unfortunately, we know less about alternative arrangements for
non-disabled students.  Many states and localities offer alternative edu-
cational programs for students who are expelled or suspended from
school.  As of 2000, eleven states required that school districts make
alternative education opportunities available to suspended or
expelled students.64  In thirty-nine states, school districts had discre-
tion to establish such programs.65  Alternative school programs are
controversial.  For decades, some policymakers and educators have
insisted that alternatives to the traditional school model are required
58 Id. at 86.
59 See Gootman, supra note 22, at B2. R
60 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-550, SPECIAL EDUCATION: CLEARER
GUIDANCE WOULD ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL DISCIPLINARY PROVISIONS 7
(2003).
61 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii) (2006) (describing the services required for
placement in alternative educational setting).
62 Susan Saulny, Students Sue School System, Claiming Denial of Education, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2004, at B3.
63 See WALTER S. GILLIAM, PREKINDERGARTENERS LEFT BEHIND: EXPULSION RATES IN
STATE PREKINDERGARTEN SYSTEMS 1 (2005) (finding that the prekindergarten expul-
sion rate is 3.2 times the rate for K–12 students).
64 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 41, at 12. R
65 Id.
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to meet the needs of all students, including those with chronic behav-
ioral problems.66  However, critics claim that “many alternative
schools are no more than holding pens for children considered to be
troublemakers,” where children are mistreated and denied adequate
instruction.67
In addition, the costs of providing alternative instructional ser-
vices to expelled students are substantial.  The American Federation
of Teachers (AFT) estimated that it cost an additional $1750 on aver-
age for a disruptive student to attend an alternative school.68  But the
AFT also found benefits that more than offset these additional costs:
“the public annually gains $14,000 in student learning time that would
have been lost, $2800 in reduced grade repetition costs, $1750 in
reduced welfare costs, and $1500 in reduced prison costs” from such a
placement.69  The AFT determined that when one hour of instruc-
tional time per day is lost to disruption, the cost is $23,429 a class per
year (based on the national average cost of $5623 per pupil-year); for
each student whom an alternative program prevents from having to
repeat a grade, the cost saving is $5623; the average cost to incarcerate
an inmate in local jails in 1993 was $14,667 a year; and federal prison
costs average $22,773 an inmate-year.70
These estimates—though obviously from an interested source—
show that bad apple students inflict significant harm on good apples
and on the system.  Much better information is desperately needed
concerning these harms.  Data are also needed on the variety of alter-
native programs to which bad apple students can be transferred, the
costs and benefits of these programs, the period of time students
remain in them, the degree of success of these programs in modifying
bad apple behaviors and returning the transferred students to main-
stream classes, the handling of disciplinary problems arising in the
alternative programs, and error rates in student classifications.  Sepa-
rate study is required to determine to what extent IDEA actually cre-
ates externalities that affect non-IDEA students and that jeopardize
other aspects of program performance.  Finally, policymakers should
consider whether the procedures now being afforded to students
accused of bad apple conduct before they can be removed are slower,
more costly, and more onerous than actually required by due process,
as defined by the courts and by considerations of fairness, accuracy,
66 SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 86. R
67 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 41, at 12. R
68 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CREATING SAFE AND DRUG-FREE SCHOOLS: AN ACTION
GUIDE 65 (1996).
69 Id.
70 SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 87. R
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and the need to protect good apples.  Some commentators, at least,
think that this is the case.71
At the time of the previous project, persistent efforts were made
to obtain existing data on some of these points from two public school
systems: New York City and New Haven.  These efforts were stymied by
a combination of factors: concerns about the effect of disclosure on
pending or future litigation against the systems, fear of adverse public-
ity about a politically sensitive area in which the systems are struggling
to cope with very difficult challenges, and other more narrowly
bureaucratic considerations.  Whatever the reasons for denying us
access to the data, filling this particular information vacuum should
be a priority for policy planners.72
The remainder of this paper describes our current study.  Part I
of the paper summarizes its background, purpose, and methodology.
Part II discusses the state of existing knowledge concerning student
suspensions in NYC and elsewhere.  Part III explains the legal-adminis-
trative process for suspending students from NYC high schools.  Part
IV presents our major findings so far.  Part V discusses next steps in
the research.
I. BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND METHODOLOGY
The authors are one of the co-authors of the earlier study
(Schuck) and two lawyers, both former teachers who are involved in
education reform (Matera and Noah).73  In an effort to extend the
research on the “bad apples” problem, we commenced the current
study of suspensions.
Suspensions play a central role in the management of the bad
apple problem.  Precisely because the stakes are so high—both for the
quality of the classroom experience of the other students and for the
individuals who receive this sanction—suspension practices raise a
host of difficult issues for the school system.  These issues, among
others, include the legal requirements of due process to students and
their families; the need to protect the educational integrity, physical
safety, and ethical standards of the classroom environment for stu-
dents and teachers; the effect of this environment on the system’s abil-
ity to recruit and retain high-quality teachers and students from
middle-class families; the effect of suspensions on the future life
chances of the sanctioned students; public confidence in the quality
71 See Underwood, supra note 26, at 800. R
72 SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 87. R
73 Schuck is a law professor at Yale; Matera and Noah joined this project while law
students at Yale.
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of the school system; and of course, the effectiveness of the suspen-
sion sanction in achieving its intended purposes.
The study has two objectives.  First, we seek to understand the
parameters of the bad apples problem in NYC’s public school system
and how the system attempts to “manage” this problem through
school suspensions.  Such understanding will also reveal whether and
to what extent the “system” functions with consistency.  More specifi-
cally, we want to learn more about the number and students who are
suspended; the reasons for the suspensions; repeat suspensions of the
same students; suspended students’ test scores and other characteris-
tics; the distribution of suspensions among different schools in the
system; and so forth.  Most of the disciplining of students, of course, is
administered by teachers in their classrooms.  Where student miscon-
duct becomes too threatening or disruptive, however, more serious
sanctions are sometimes employed, including suspensions and expul-
sions.  The process that culminates in this sanction is described in Part
III.
Second, we hope to shed light on what happens to students after
they are suspended.  Do they go to alternative schools in the system?
Return to the regular schools?  Join the military or the civilian work
force?  Enter the juvenile or adult criminal justice systems?  Move to
different communities?  Disappear from view?  For reasons discussed
in Part V, we have not yet begun to pursue this second objective, but
we have made considerable progress with the first.
In 2007, at the outset of the study, we requested that the New
York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) provide data going
back to the 2005–2006 school year on various parameters of the
“superintendent’s suspensions” imposed on students in the city’s pub-
lic schools.  NYCDOE agreed to do so and has provided the same data
for subsequent years.  At present, we have collected suspension data
covering the period from 2005–2010, and hope to receive the data for
2010–2011 soon.  For each of the system’s schools for which we have
data,74 the data for each academic year includes the total number of
enrolled students; the number of suspensions; the average test scores
for that school; the specific test scores of the individual students who
were suspended in that year; the number of times each individual stu-
dent was suspended; and information about whether a suspension was
74 The number of schools in the data set has varied, see supra note 5.  NYCDOE
reported information about 1509 schools in 2005–2006 and 2006–2007; 1302 schools
in 2007–2008; 1359 schools in 2008–2009; and 1406 schools in 2009–2010.
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a Principal’s Suspension or a Regional Superintendent’s
Suspension.75
II. STUDIES OF SUSPENSION PRACTICES
When we commenced this study, we could find no systematic
compilation, analysis, and publication of data on suspensions from the
New York City schools, much less an account of how they are han-
dled.76  Just last month, NYCDOE itself released extensive data about
the 2010–2011 school year, leading to more discussion of correlations
with race and special needs status,77 as well as income status.78  And
earlier this year the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU)
reported a major study of suspensions in the New York City schools.79
The NYCLU focused on tracking the overall increase in the number
of suspensions over time, despite a contemporaneous drop in student
enrollment; on the disproportionate number of suspensions given to
African American students and students with disabilities; and on the
growing number of “zero-tolerance” offenses in the New York City reg-
75 Our data set generally only includes information about schools where at least
one suspension was issued in a year.  We tried to reconcile this data with a separate
data set listing school enrollment for each year, but sometimes it was unclear if a
school had zero suspensions or was simply closed.  In addition, sometimes enrollment
seemed to be declining or increasing rapidly, likely because a particular school was
being phased out or phased in.  We have attempted to control for these possibilities,
but our data set is imperfect.  The data that we received was often in a different for-
mat from year to year; for example, one year of data might have every single suspen-
sion displayed in a separate row in a data table while another year of data might have
a separate row for each unique suspended student.  We sought to standardize the data
format so that we could make comparisons across years, and, although we have confi-
dence in the accuracy of the data overall, there may still be some minor errors in
calculation or compilation.  When we complete the study, we will have validated all of
the data for accuracy.
76 An extensive body of research demonstrates that minority students, male stu-
dents, low-income students, and students with special needs are suspended more
often. See, e.g., DANIEL J. LOSEN & RUSSELL J. SKIBA, SUSPENDED EDUCATION: URBAN
MIDDLE SCHOOLS IN CRISIS (2010), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
research/k-12-education/school-discipline/suspended-education-urban-middle-
schools-in-crisis/Suspended-Education_FINAL-2.pdf.
77 See Geoff Decker, For First Time, DOE Details School Safety, Suspension Numbers,
GOTHAM SCHOOLS (Nov. 1, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://gothamschools.org/2011/11/01/
for-first-time-doe-releases-detailed-school-safety-data/.
78 See Udi Ofer, Reporting on School Suspensions is the First Step, SCHOOLBOOK, N.Y.
TIMES (NOV. 7, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/schoolbook/2011/11/07/
reporting-on-student-suspensions-is-the-first-step/.
79 NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, EDUCATION INTERRUPTED: THE GROWING USE
OF SUSPENSIONS IN NEW YORK CITY’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2011), available at http://
www.nyclu.org/files/publications/Suspension_Report_FINAL_noSpreads.pdf.
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ulations governing school districts.  The NYCLU study, which recom-
mended reducing the number of zero-tolerance offenses and
increasing the use of alternatives to suspension,80 is the latest in a
series of important studies that demonstrate that students of color,
male students, and students with special needs are suspended dispro-
portionately.  The NYCLU study also found, intriguingly, that a large
number of suspensions are issued in March and June of each aca-
demic year.
Our findings are consistent with the NYCLU’s findings in many
ways.  For example, we found that Hispanic, and particularly black stu-
dents, are overrepresented among suspended students, as are male
students.
FIGURE 1
Native American
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White
Unknown
1% 3%
36%
53%
7%
Asian
Black
Hispanic
White
Other11%
35% 41%
12%
1%
Entire Student Population by Race Suspended Students By Race
FIGURE 2
72%
28%
Male
Female
Suspended Students By Sex
80 Id. at 26–27; see also Anna M. Phillips, Calming Schools by Focusing on Well-Being of
Troubled Students, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at A28 (discussing Turnaround for Chil-
dren, a nonprofit organization that focuses on students’ psychological and emotional
well-being, as a potential alternative to suspension).
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The NYCLU data and analysis are important.  But, we hope to go
behind and beyond that study’s work in order to determine how
schools actually use suspensions to manage behavior and how these
methods affect both the students who are suspended and the rest of
the school community.  The NYCLU study, for example, seems to
assume that suspensions are undesirable and that the best, most
rational school system will have the fewest suspensions, perhaps ide-
ally none.
If that is its assumption, we disagree with it.  Suspension may be a
useful, even essential, tool.  First, by removing the students who are
acting as “bad apples,” it can enable the vast majority of students to
learn without undue disruption.  Second, suspensions may deter indi-
vidual students from future misbehavior, either because of their inter-
nal determination to do better or because of pressure from home.
Third, suspensions may deter other students from serious misbehavior
once they see the dire consequences of such misbehavior.  This is not
to deny, of course, the possibility that (as the NYCLU study con-
cluded) suspensions may be inconsistently or arbitrarily imposed, or
that they may, because of other features of the suspension system, end
up depriving suspended students of access to an effective (and consti-
tutionally required) educational program.  Absent the kind of study
we have undertaken, one cannot assess the system with confidence.
Rather, one can only speculate based on untested assumptions.
Suspension policies cannot be criticized, understood, assessed, or
improved unless we know how the New York City schools actually use
suspensions and what effects these suspensions have on individuals
and schools as a whole.  It is established that some demographic
groups of students are more likely to be suspended than are others.81
But other important questions remain to be investigated: How many
individual students are suspended two times or more in a year?  To
what extent is suspension tantamount to expulsion?  Do students and
families receive the procedural protection prescribed by the city’s reg-
ulations?  Is that procedural protection excessive, all things consid-
ered, as Arum suggests?82  How much variation is there in suspensions
over time in the system as a whole and in individual schools?  In a
given time period, how much variation is there among individual
schools?  Do different administrators suspend students more or less
frequently and why?  How do suspensions correlate with test scores at
81 See NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 79, at 3. R
82 See ARUM, supra note 23, at 1–37 (examining the extent to which judicial court R
decisions have affected the use of procedural processes in public school discipline).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-5\NDL509.txt unknown Seq: 16 16-AUG-12 9:49
2078 notre dame law review [vol. 87:5
both the individual and the school levels?  Are such correlations
causal, and if so, which way does the causal arrow point?
III. THE FORMAL SUSPENSION PROCESS
The formal process for issuing suspensions is detailed in the
Chancellor’s Regulations of the New York City Department of Educa-
tion, in state regulations, and in the city’s discipline code.83  Here, we
describe the process as set forth in the Chancellor’s Regulations,
which establish a quasi-judicial set of rules and policies.
The regulations first detail how students are to be removed from
a particular class.  In this process, a principal has substantial discretion
to remove students from class for one to four days without suspending
them.84  This shorter removal period, usually termed an “in school
action,” may help to maintain an orderly learning environment, but
these removals are difficult to track,85 and they are not recorded as
suspensions.
The regulations provide for two types of suspensions with similar
but distinct procedures.86  For both types, a student must not stay
home but instead report to school and be in an alternative setting, or
report to an alternative site.87  Students with diagnosed disabilities
enjoy special protections in disciplinary proceedings, as mentioned
above, but this report will focus on the process for students in the
general-education population.
A Principal’s Suspension of one to five days may, as the name
suggests, be issued on the principal’s own authority without prior
authorization from district leadership (see fig. 3).88  For students
below the fourth grade, however, the principal must obtain the prior
approval of the relevant regional superintendent.89  Written notice to
home is required and a conference must be scheduled between the
83 See NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 79, at 8–11 (providing a broad R
overview of the way in which these documents regulate suspension in New York City).
84 NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF EDUC., REGULATION OF THE CHANCELLOR A–443 22
(2004) [hereinafter REGULATION A–443].
85 See NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 79, at 10 n.9.  The NYC regu- R
lations, however, indicate that principals are supposed to track this information. REG-
ULATION A–443, supra note 84, at 17. R
86 REGULATION A–443, supra note 84, at 19–52 (detailing the procedures regard- R
ing the two types of suspensions, Principal’s Suspensions and Regional Superinten-
dent’s Suspensions).
87 Id. at 19–20 (discussing the requirements of alternative instruction).
88 Id. at 22.
89 Id. at 21.
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principal and the student’s parents or guardians.90  Nevertheless, the
conference may proceed even if neither the suspended student nor
his or her parents attend, so long as the principal attends.91  This
implies (if this rule is consistently followed) that the benefits of each
suspension must outweigh the time and other resources that the prin-
cipal must spend on this matter.
FIGURE 3.  PRINCIPAL’S SUSPENSION PROCESS
Clear or present danger of
physical injury to the student,
other students or school
personnel, or prevents the
orderly operation of classes
or other school activities
Written notice to
parents/guardians – sent
also to regional
superintendent
Principal’s Suspension
conference
(student remains in class until
conference unless  continuing
danger or presents threat of
disruption)
(principal is not required to
give the student an opportunity
to be heard)
(conference can occur
even if no representative
of the student attends
the conference)Possible
appeal
Suspension of 1-5
days issued
*Note: this is a simplified outline and does not encompass every possible iteration of the process
A Regional Superintendent’s Suspension, the response to more
serious misbehavior, may last as long as a year.92  This process is more
complex and formal, and provides for a hearing before a hearing
officer (see fig. 4).93  Although a hearing may proceed if the sus-
pended student’s family is not present, the school district must
explain the efforts made to secure the family’s attendance.94  Prior to
the hearing, a family may also plead no contest or work with the
90 Id. at 23–24.
91 Id. at 25.
92 Id. at 52.
93 Id. at 39–45.
94 Id. at 42 n.14.
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school toward a more informal, earlier resolution, forestalling any for-
mal hearing at all.95
FIGURE 4.  SUPERINTENDENT’S SUSPENSION PROCESS
Many infractions require that
the administrator seeks a
superintendent’s suspension,
including weapons and
drug offenses Investigation –including
witness statements and
opportunity for student
to write a response
Notification of
regional
superintendent and
requestfor approval
Written
notification of
parent/guardian
Early Resolution Conference –
held on day of hearing to discuss
education options –suspension
sustained
No contest plea – suspension
sustained
Hearing before hearing officer –
includes good deal of
quasi-judicial procedure
Possible
appeal
Suspension
for up to one
year
*Note: this is a simplified outline and does not encompass every possible iteration of the process
Both types of suspension may be appealed, and the regulations
for both the original and appeals processes detail the required proce-
dure, which can be protracted.96  We do not yet know how the regula-
tions are actually implemented.  For example, how often do
administrators skip some of the optional steps (e.g., by not talking
with a student before issuing a Principal’s Suspension)?  How often do
parents and families either fail to attend conferences and hearings or
plead no contest and formally fail to contest a school’s disciplinary
decisions?  Does ignorance about the process or the exigencies of
administrators’ jobs lead to shortcuts or other compromises with the
formality of the suspension process?
IV. THE SUSPENSION DATA
To answer these questions, we studied the five years (2005–2010)
of suspension data provided to us by the NYCDOE.  Although our
95 Id. at 38.
96 Id. at 63–67.
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analysis remains incomplete, the data reveal some intriguing correla-
tions that invite further data-gathering and analysis.
A. Schools
We analyzed suspensions reported at every school across the five-
year period, examining enrollment counts at the school in order to
compare not just the absolute number of suspensions but also the rate
of suspensions as compared to the size of the student population.  The
data indicate that even given the general trend of increasing suspen-
sions, the absolute number and proportions at individual schools
often vary over the relevant time period, including some large fluctua-
tions from year to year.
We identified approximately fifty schools that experienced such
large fluctuations in suspensions.  The data that we have assembled
about these schools include the progress report grades that the
NYCDOE awarded the schools and, for some years, whether the
school’s principal changed.  In the next research phase, we hope to
gather more information about many of these schools, as well as about
a subset of schools with more consistent suspension rates.
To illustrate potential patterns, we present a snapshot of four
schools.  Although the names are made up, the data are from actual
schools in the NYC system.  The first, called New Sheriff Middle
School illustrates one typical suspension pattern.  A new principal
comes in and dramatically increases the number of suspensions while
also strongly improving the school’s academic performance (as mea-
sured by the admittedly imperfect NYC Progress Reports).  Once the
students have adjusted to the new regime, the suspension level
FIGURE 5.  NEW SHERIFF MIDDLE SCHOOL
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declines while academic performance remains relatively stable.  More
order in the classroom is presumably maintained, making suspensions
less necessary.
Our second school, Things Fall Apart High, reveals a different
pattern.  A new principal starts and the school then experiences a rela-
tively flat but slightly lower suspension rate.  Yet academic perform-
ance drops, first slowly and then more precipitously as the suspension
rate plummets.  The principal appears to be losing control of student
misbehavior in the school, perhaps because of some change in per-
sonnel or other conditions there that produced a more lax attitude
toward discipline.
FIGURE 6.  THINGS FALL APART HIGH
09-1008-0907-0806-0705-06
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
158 C
227
283
88
B
D
80
N
ew
 P
ri
nc
ip
al
A school like Long Road Middle tells an even more vexing story.
At first, more suspensions seem to correlate with higher academic per-
FIGURE 7.  LONG ROAD MIDDLE SCHOOL
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formance, but then the students’ grades start declining independent
of the number of suspensions.  Was the school too demanding, too
lenient, or just inconsistent?  Alternatively, did suspensions play only a
small role in the school’s erratic academic performance over these
five years?
Finally, there is a school like Hamlet High.  This school appears
to be consistently successful despite a highly varying number of sus-
pended students each year.
FIGURE 8.  HAMLET HIGH
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In order to understand better what happened at these four
schools—and to find trends at the school-system level—we hope to
answer several questions about how these and other schools use sus-
pensions.  What caused large changes in suspension rates?  How
aligned are the school’s administration and its staff with respect to
suspension policy?  To what extent do the schools adhere to NYCDOE
suspension policy?  How do families respond to suspensions, and do
they often contest the suspension by showing up at a hearing or
appeal a decision afterward?  Which academic and behavioral sup-
ports are available at these schools to help reduce the number of sus-
pensions?  Do some teachers remove students from class or request
suspensions more often than others, and how do these patterns corre-
late with teacher effectiveness?  Do principals and teachers perceive
that suspension effectively helps struggling students change their
behavior and their grades?  Does students’ perception that a principal
will suspend students acting as “bad apples” deter other students from
misbehaving?  Do demographically similar schools use suspension
similarly?
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B. Students
Our data reveal that many students receive two or more suspen-
sions.  In fact, the growth in suspensions over the past five years tracks
a similarly-sized growth in the number of students suspended twice or
more.  This pattern raises a host of intriguing questions.  Are the post-
suspension interventions and supports for students adequate, and
what would “adequacy” mean?  Could a new type of post-suspension
intervention arrest the trend of increasing suspensions?  What degree
and evidence of misbehavior would justify some sort of alternative
placement—in an alternative school, perhaps—and how should offi-
cials determine which types of alternative placements are appropriate
for which students?
Some students are suspended far more frequently in a single
school year.  More than 128 students were suspended ten or more
times in one school year over the past five years; indeed, three of
those students have been suspended ten or more times in two different
school years.  The number of students suspended ten or more times in
a year trended upward every year until 2009–2010, when it dropped
dramatically.  Similarly, the population of students suspended three
or more times numbers in the thousands each year, with a significant
upward trend between 2005 and 2010, but with no similar decline in
the final year for which we have data.  Students with ten or more sus-
pensions almost all score much lower than average on state examina-
tions (and we suspect that some similar pattern is true of students with
three or more suspensions).  We do not know, but hope to investigate,
whether there is a causal relationship here between discipline and aca-
demic performance, and which way the causal arrow points.  Finally,
almost none of the students suspended ten or more times seem to
have switched schools during the school year; apparently, the same
school keeps suspending the same student over and over.
It takes a great deal of a principal’s time and resources to suspend
one student ten times in a school year—or ten students one time in a
year.  How much time and resources are consumed in these situa-
tions?  Under what circumstances do principals think that it is worth
it?  Are some principals actually using these types of repeated suspen-
sions as a type of de facto expulsion?  Is there some sort of intensive
support or alternate intervention that, if available for this small num-
ber of students (approximately thirty per year, on average) would gen-
erate large savings in time and resources while better preparing this
group of very difficult students academically (or vocationally)?
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FIGURE 9.
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C. Test Scores
Based on a preliminary analysis (table X) of test scores from
grade three through nine, suspended students consistently score far
below the average of all NYC students.
In addition, students suspended in one year also scored far below
average in the previous year.  For example, students who were sus-
pended in the 2006–2007 school year on average had below-average
test scores in 2005–2006 regardless of whether they were also sus-
pended in 2005–2006.  Several questions are worth exploring here,
including:
—To what extent is low academic achievement causing students to
get suspended (because of frustration, for example)?  Would earlier
academic intervention help to reduce the suspension rate?
—To what extent are suspensions (and the resulting missed work
and reduced motivation) instead causing some of the low academic
achievement?  If so, would more intensive academic support for sus-
pended students help to mitigate the academic damage caused by
suspension?
—What role does effective teaching play in the frequency of suspen-
sion?  As NYC considers releasing data about teachers’ value-added
scores (relating to academic achievement) in response to requests
from media outlets, can we find out whether, say, fourth graders in
a classroom with high value-added teaching are suspended at a dif-
ferent rate than fourth graders across the hall in a classroom with
low value-added teaching?  Obtaining and using this information
may necessitate system-level data, followed by school-level
interviews.
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  There are some other important questions that the data we already
have cannot definitively answer.  For example, what is the post-suspen-
sion trajectory of these students?  Do they drop out or transfer to dif-
ferent school systems at a higher rate?  Do they later take GED
courses?  What is their high school (and college) graduation rate?  Do
they enter the labor market, the military, the criminal justice system,
or colleges and technical schools?  We would need more longitudinal
data in order to answer these questions, though we will begin to
explore the answers through our interviews with principals and teach-
ers.  Among the more policy-relevant questions is whether suspension
is more effective system-wide than alternative, but less punitive, sanc-
tions (e.g., detention, more parental involvement), and  which roles
are most effective in maintaining student discipline (e.g. teachers,
principals, deans, parents, or some combination)?
V. NEXT STEPS
Once we receive, analyze, and integrate the data for academic
year 2010–2011 that has been requested from NYCDOE, we plan to
conduct personal interviews with a subset of the principals in the sys-
tem in order to explore some of the questions mentioned above that
the data itself cannot answer, such as the school resources required to
suspend a student, the perceived relationship between teacher quality
and classroom disruptions and suspensions, the subsequent career of
suspended students, possible improvements in the suspension system,
and the like.  To that end, we prepared a standardized interview pro-
tocol and in May of 2011 sent emails to a relatively small number of
principals whose email addresses we were able to obtain, in which we
requested interviews on-site or elsewhere, at their convenience (hope-
fully during the summer when they would have more time), and
attached the interview protocol.97  A small number replied and agreed
to such interviews, but before we could actually schedule them, the
NYCDOE institutional review board (“IRB”), which we had worked
with for years, asked for a long list of information before renewing our
approval.  On June 29, 2011, we sent the IRB answers to all of these
questions.  As of mid-November, we are still awaiting the IRB’s
response and thus cannot proceed with any of the interviewing.
97 We hoped that the principals whom we interviewed might identify some teach-
ers of suspended students in their schools, teachers whom we might then interview
with a view to gaining an even more “on-the-ground” understanding of suspension
practices and consequences.
